Presidential Election

19 February 2003

Yerevan, 20 February 2003. The International Election Observation
Mission (IEOM) for the 19 February presidential election is a joint undertaking
of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

This statement of preliminary findings and conclusions is issued before the
final certification of the results, before election day electoral complaints and
appeals have been addressed by the administrative and judicial authorities, and
before a complete analysis of the observation findings.

The 19 February 2003 presidential election in the Republic of Armenia was
generally calm and well administered but the counting process was flawed and the
long-term election process fell short of international standards in several key
respects.

This was the fourth presidential election since Armenia declared independence
in 1991 and the first since Armenia became a member of the Council of Europe.
Previous presidential elections were characterized by serious flaws and
generally did not meet international standards. As such, this election provided
an important test of the progress of democratic practices in Armenia.

A number of important positive elements were evident in the election process:

• The participation of nine candidates provided voters with a genuine
  choice;
  
  
  
   
• There was a vigorous, country-wide campaign, with active public
  participation and in which opposition candidates did not hesitate to criticize
  the authorities;
  
  
  
   
• A recently amended election law provides a basis for democratic elections;
  
  
  
   
• The election administration carried out the technical preparations for the
  election in a satisfactory manner;
  
  
  
   
• The voting, counting and tabulation processes were generally transparent;
  and
  
  
  
   
• The voter lists were improved, although they remained problematic.
  
  
  
   

Despite these positive factors, a number of significant shortcomings in
regard to international standards were apparent:

• The pre-election period was marred by intimidation and by incidents of
  disruption of campaign events, including a serious instance of violence;
  
  
  
   
• There was evidence of pre-election manipulations, such as schemes to
  impersonate voters and use of inducements to secure votes;
  
  
  
   
• Public resources were heavily used in support of the incumbent,
  representing a pattern of unequal treatment of candidates by the authorities;
  and
  
  
  
   
• Public TV failed to comply with its legal obligation to provide balanced
  and unbiased reporting on candidates, violating the principle of equal access
  for all candidates.
  
  
  
   

On election day observers reported an essentially transparent process and
that voting was generally calm and correctly conducted. Substantial numbers of
candidate proxies and domestic observers monitored the process. However, a
number of serious irregularities took place, including instances of ballot-box
stuffing. While voting day processes were generally positively assessed by
international observers, the counting process was more problematic. Further
instances of ballot-box stuffing were witnessed by observers during the count
and preliminary results from some polling stations showed a striking disparity
from an otherwise consistent pattern of results.

The final assessment of these elections will depend, in part, on the
completion of the counting and tabulation and, if relevant, the effectiveness of
the complaints procedure. The institutions involved in the IEOM will continue to
monitor these remaining steps of the process, and will return to observe the
upcoming parliamentary elections in May.

The institutions represented in the IEOM are prepared to assist the
authorities and civil society of Armenia in overcoming the remaining impediments
to fully democratic elections and to build on those improvements that have been
put in place.

Background

The 19 February presidential election was the fourth since independence was
declared in September 1991 and the first since Armenia joined the Council of
Europe in January 2001. Significantly, it was also the first national contest to
be held in the wake of the assassinations of leading figures in Armenia's
political establishment during a 27 October 1999 attack on the parliament
building. The presidential election will be followed by parliamentary elections
in May, which may coincide with a constitutional referendum.

A total of 15 candidates, including the incumbent President, presented
applications to participate in the election. Eleven were ultimately registered
by the CEC, two of whom subsequently withdrew from the race. Under Armenia's
electoral system, a presidential candidate must win over 50% of the votes cast
for all candidates in order to be elected in the first round.

Legislative Framework

The Election Code, adopted in 1999 and amended in 2002, provided a basis upon
which the election could be conducted in compliance with international
standards. The 2002 amendments included a number of positive elements, some of
which reflected recommendations made by experts on behalf of the OSCE/ODIHR and
Council of Europe, Venice Commission. A remaining deficiency of the law is the
absence of a provision requiring the CEC and TECs to publish worksheets with
full breakdown of results from all polling stations in their jurisdictions in a
timely manner.

As a result of Armenia's ratification of the European Convention on Human
Rights, notably Protocol 1 Article 3, election-related complaints can now be
appealed to the European Court of Human Rights.

Election Administration

The election was administered by a three-tier election administration: the
CEC, 56 TECs and approximately 1,865 Precinct Electoral Commissions (PECs).

The formula for appointing CEC members - three nominated by the President,
and one each by the six factions in Parliament as established following the last
election - resulted in two-thirds of CEC members being supporters of the
President. TECs and PECs were formed according to the same formula as the CEC.
Although the appointment formula itself is not necessarily problematic, the
imbalance in membership for the current election resulted in most candidates
expressing a lack of confidence in the impartiality of the CEC. As observed in
certain instances, it was possible for lower level election commissions to form
a quorum, conduct business and adopt decisions with no presence of the
opposition.

The CEC and most TECs operated efficiently. Preparations for elections were
completed on schedule. The CEC took positive decisions to use transparent ballot
boxes and to rebroadcast abroad the free TV advertising time accorded to
candidates (although the latter was not enforced). A good program of training
for election commission members was established. Judges were also trained to
handle election day issues.

There were a number of efforts to intimidate or manipulate certain PECs. For
example, pressure applied by local community leaders upon four members of a PEC
in Shirak led to three of them tendering their resignations; other pressure
included at least one PEC member in Yerevan nominated by the opposition being
summoned to a meeting with a manager for a rival candidate and being told not to
be obstructive. In three cases from Lori there were substitutions of PEC members
without their nominating faction's consent. In Armavir, a properly nominated
substitute to a PEC complained that his membership, and that of two others in
neighboring PECs, were not recognized and they were not invited to meetings.

The accuracy of voter lists remained a concern. Voter lists are locally
compiled and there is no centralized voter register, making it impossible to
check the lists for double entries. In many municipalities the lists were
improved in comparison with past elections, as a result of concerted efforts to
correct errors. With some exceptions, voter lists were on display, as required,
in the PECs, providing voters an opportunity to correct their individual data.
However, international observers found that the lists in some regions continued
to be problematic. The voter lists also include very large numbers of citizens
with the right to vote who are not residing in Armenia, opening a potential for
manipulation on election day. Polling stations in Armenian Embassies and
Consulates provided the opportunity for some Armenians abroad to vote. As the
result of a positive Constitutional Court decision in October 2002, voters who
could not find their names on the voter list on election day were able to appeal
to courts to obtain a certificate to permit them to vote.

The Campaign

Nine candidates were ultimately on the ballot for the election. The incumbent
President was nominated by an initiative group, but he had the backing of about
a dozen political parties or other organizations. Seven of the other eight
candidates were leaders of political parties. Efforts by several of the
opposition parties to unify behind a single candidate were not successful.

The campaign began slowly but quickly escalated in activity and tone, with
posters, rallies and other campaign activity much in evidence around the
country, and with active public participation. The field of nine candidates
provided voters with a genuine choice. Opposition candidates did not hesitate to
criticize the incumbent. In general, however, campaigning, especially by
opposition candidates, was not issue-based.

Serious violence broke out at a campaign rally on 4 February, including the
stabbing of a member of parliament. Although the violence was strongly condemned
from all quarters, it cast a shadow over the campaign. There were disturbances
also at a rally for the incumbent in Yerevan on 13 February, with violence
towards peaceful demonstrators who unfurled opposition banners. Earlier in the
campaign there were also credible reports of the disruption of another
opposition candidate's campaign rallies near Yerevan through intimidation. An
opposition candidate's campaign office was vandalized in Abovyan, and a major
campaign billboard was subject to apparent arson.

Observer investigations, interviews with witnesses, and credible first-hand
accounts revealed certain patterns of intimidation. Several persons associated
with opposition campaigns were dismissed from their jobs, while others were
threatened with dismissal. There was a credible pattern of reports of opposition
campaign staff or volunteers being threatened to give up their activities. A
number of shop owners were threatened against displaying opposition campaign
posters. There was a discernible pattern of alleged intimidation by village
leaders and others to support the incumbent or face consequences such as the
withdrawal of utilities. Family members and reputable non-governmental
organizations reported threats of violence against conscripts. Observers
received and verified other cases of intimidation and received further credible
reports which could not be independently verified. Observers also received a
large number of allegations that proved unfounded upon investigation or were
spurious. The cumulative effect of various practices of intimidation was that
the campaign took place in an atmosphere of insecurity.

The long-term observation mission received and investigated widespread
reports of efforts to acquire individuals' passports in order to impersonate
them on election day, and parallel reports of schemes to obtain passport numbers
of persons who would not be voting (e.g., those not in the country) in order to
fraudulently cast votes for them on election day. These reports followed
consistent patterns in Yerevan and around the country. The EOM confirmed several
accounts of passport acquisition, although observers did not report passport
fraud to be a significant problem on election day.

The widespread availability of public resources in favour of the incumbent
was confirmed by observers around the country. Some public officials at the
local level were engaged full-time in running the incumbent's campaign while
performing their official duties, or were observed to continue conducting public
business from their campaign offices. Public buildings such as mayors' offices
were commonly used for campaign purposes, overwhelmingly by the incumbent's
team. A few such instances were corrected before the election.

Where the authorities provide office space to opposition parties, in general
the quality of such space did not nearly match what was made available to the
incumbent for the campaign. Some opposition candidates reported difficulties in
securing premises for campaign offices; observers were credibly notified of two
instances of campaigns abandoning plans to open offices following intimidation,
and two other cases of official orders to vacate premises suddenly declared
unsafe.

Observers received and verified many allegations that public sector
employees, factory workers, teachers, students and others were instructed to
attend the incumbent's rallies in various parts of the country. For example,
observers attended rallies in Lori, Gegharkunik and Yerevan, where they spoke to
people so instructed. In several regions, including Shirak, Lori and Gegharkunik,
schools were closed and pupils and teachers required to attend the incumbent's
rallies.

Although under Armenian law some public officials may be involved in
political campaigns and public buildings may be used for campaign purposes, the
patterns of such practices in this election were sufficient to breach OSCE
commitments that all candidates should be treated equally by the authorities.

The Media

The cases of two private TV broadcasters that remained off the air throughout
the campaign period as a result of problematic tender processes negatively
affected the electronic media environment, and contributed to a lack of balanced
sources of information. TV A1+, in particular, was expected to offer an
independent and diverse range of information about candidates. The December 2002
assassination of the head of the public television council - who was close to
the President - and an October grenade attack on another journalist, both remain
unsolved. The combination of lost licenses and incidents of violence, as well as
credibly reported intimidation especially in the regions, cast a shadow over the
media atmosphere and led some journalists and broadcasters to exercise
self-censorship.

Publicly-funded media did not meet its obligation outlined in the Law on
Radio and TV Broadcasting, as well as in a CEC decision of 15 January, to
provide voters with information about the candidates free from prejudice or
preference. While public TV adhered to the legal provisions relating to
providing free advertising time for all political contestants, its news coverage
was biased, as were its analytical and other programs. These clearly supported
the incumbent, who received extensive coverage beyond what was reasonably
proportionate to his role as head of state. The President received 41% of
primetime coverage on public TV news and analytical programs, almost all of it
(93%) in his capacity as a candidate rather than engaged in presidential duties.
The next most covered candidates received 19% and 11%. Moreover, virtually all
public TV coverage (93%) of the incumbent was positive or neutral, while
opposition candidates received roughly equal proportions of negative and
positive primetime news and analytical coverage.

Private broadcasters were even more biased in favour of the incumbent,
largely ignoring opposition candidates. For example, the only private channel
with nationwide outreach, Prometevs, allocated 61% of its prime-time news
to the incumbent with an exclusively positive tone. In contrast, two candidates
considered as opposition front-runners accounted for 5% and 3% respectively,
with this coverage mainly negative.

The rate set for paid political advertising by private broadcasters, at U.S.
$120 per minute, was very high by local standards, limiting candidates'
possibilities to campaign in the media. The rate emerged from an unusual
price-fixing agreement among public television and five private television
stations that offered air time for political advertising. This rate for
political advertising was approximately three times higher than comparable rates
for commercial advertising on private television.

The National Commission on Radio and Television reported receiving and
adjudicating 54 complaints. In two cases private broadcasters were fined for
violating the Law on Radio and TV Broadcasting and the CEC decision of 15
January, by broadcasting paid advertisements that were not clearly designated as
such.

The print media provided a plurality of views, but invariably showed strong
bias either in favour of or against a candidate. Consequently, voters could form
an objective view of the campaign only if they read several publications. The
state-funded Hayastani Hanrapetutyun showed clear support for the
incumbent by allocating him 66% of its candidate coverage, with an
overwhelmingly (99%) positive or neutral slant. In comparison, two candidates
considered as opposition front-runners received only 5% and 2% of the coverage,
which was mainly negative in tone. Some private newspapers provided more
coverage of opposition candidates, and were largely critical of the incumbent.
The Aravot daily, for example, allocated 37% of its coverage to the
incumbent, with an overwhelmingly negative tone.

Complaints and Appeals

By election day the CEC had registered just 34 complaints, all of which it
had responded to. Even fewer complaints were filed by interested parties with
the courts. The absence of substantive decisions in two cases were of concern
because of their impact on the electoral process. One important case appealed a
CEC decision limiting the right of proxies on election day. Although the
Electoral Code provides for an expedited timeframe for hearing cases regarding
actions of the CEC, in this instance the judge deemed the case to fall within
the normal civil procedures and scheduled the hearing for after the election.
The other case involved a CEC decision that public TV must broadcast free
campaign spots as part of their out-of-country programming. The court dismissed
the case on the grounds that the applicant had withdrawn from the race as a
candidate.

The relatively low number of complaints reflects a general lack of confidence
in the effectiveness and independence of the dispute resolution mechanisms
available to candidates and voters.

Gender

There are no legal barriers to participation by women in the political
process. Although there were no women candidates in this election, a number of
women were active in the election process through participation in the election
administration, political parties and NGOs. Women are seriously underrepresented
in elected positions at all levels in Armenia; only 3% of elected officials at
local and national levels are women. Only one of nine CEC members is a woman,
but women were somewhat better represented in the TECs and PECs. Issues of
particular concern to women were generally not effectively addressed during the
election campaign.

Domestic Observers

Of 31 domestic groups that applied to observe the election, 29 were
accredited by the CEC. The most substantial domestic observation was carried out
by "It's Your Choice", which observed the pre-election period and reportedly
deployed observers to over 400 PECs throughout the country on election day.
Other groups focused on specific elements of the election, such as media
monitoring or legal issues.

Election Day, Vote Count and Tabulation

On election day observers reported that voting was generally calm and
relatively well administered throughout the country. Voting procedures were
correctly followed in most polling stations and PEC members appeared to be well
trained. A significant number of candidate proxies were present in all polling
stations visited and domestic observers were seen in almost 50% of polling
stations. Observers assessed the voting process positively in 90% of polling
stations.

However, international observers reported a number of serious irregularities
during voting. These included six cases of ballot-box stuffing in Yerevan,
Armavir and Kotayk (polling station numbers 1353, 1253, 0695, 0800, 0708, 0700),
as well as an incident of "carousel" voting in Shirak (polling station number
1373), an incident of vote buying in a polling station in Ararat (polling
station number 0586) and examples in Ararat, Yerevan and Gegharkunik of
individuals voting more than once (polling stations number 0327, 0586, 0896). In
Lori, a policeman was witnessed carrying a box of at least 50 passports out of a
polling station. Intimidation of proxies was observed in a number of polling
stations. The presence of unauthorized persons, including government officials,
in polling stations (23%) remains a continuing concern, particularly as in a few
cases they were seen acting in an intimidating manner.

While most observers reported that counting procedures were properly
followed, a number of serious irregularities were observed. The counting process
was negatively assessed by observers in 20% of polling stations where counting
was observed. Clear evidence of ballot box stuffing was witnessed by
international observers in five PECs (polling station numbers 0250, 0703, 0219,
0122 and 0133) as well as substantial falsification of results in polling
station number 0390. In one polling station, two proxies were physically
assaulted by PEC members. The chairperson of one PEC was witnessed stopping on
the way to the TEC to give a copy of the results to the Police. The preliminary
results reported from some polling stations showed a striking disparity both in
voter turnout and outcome from the otherwise consistent pattern of results.

The voting, counting and tabulation processes were generally transparent. In
a welcome development, the CEC promptly published preliminary polling station
results and in most polling stations protocols were made available to proxies
and observers. In more than 90% of polling stations proxies and domestic
observers were able to observe all aspects of the voting process.